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Abstract: This paper articulates the potential implications of Brexit on energy policy and security
in the United Kingdom (UK). Given the uncertainties associated with the decision to leave the
European Union (EU), the need to consider its potential effects on the UK’s energy sector becomes
even more pertinent. Through the lens of a few widely reviewed trade regimes in the light of Brexit,
it can be observed that while UK energy policies are unlikely to change drastically, Brexit nevertheless
threatens the UK’s capacity to safeguard its energy supply. The uncertainties following Brexit could
arguably starve the UK’s upstream petroleum, electricity, and renewable energy sectors of their
required investments. Both short and long-term impacts could result in UK residents paying more
per unit of energy consumed in a “hard Brexit” scenario, where the UK exits the Internal Energy
Market (IEM) and must trade with the EU under World Trade Organisation rules. While a hard Brexit
could aid the growth of the nascent shale gas industry, a negotiated withdrawal that includes some
form of access to the IEM (a “soft Brexit”) would be more beneficial for the future of energy security
in the UK.
Keywords: BREXIT; UK; energy policy; European Union
1. Introduction
A historic referendum was held on 23 June 2016, wherein the British people voted to exit the
European Union (EU), a decision generally referred to as “Brexit”. It is a new phenomenon for
a member state to exit the EU. The closest to this uncharted path in the history of the Union was
the 1985 referendum by Greenland, a sovereignty of Denmark with overseas territory geographically
located outside Europe. The procedural articulation of a member state’s intent to leave the Union
is provided in Article 50 of the Treaty of the European Union (TEU). This allows for a two-year
negotiation of the terms of withdrawal and possible relationship structure regarding, inter alia, energy
and trade regimes, post notification of intent by the exiting party. The strategic direction of the so-called
“divorce” is then negotiated, and different stakeholders contribute to the process at different levels
both before and during the dialogue.
In the weeks before the Brexit referendum, there were warnings from major multinational energy
companies including BP, Centrica, and Shell that a vote to leave the EU could potentially result in
significant long-term damage to the economy of the United Kingdom (UK). Also, the UK Treasury in
its report on the implications of Brexit concluded that the UK would be better off in the EU. The report
argued that the economy would be 6.2% larger, British families would be £4300 richer, and tax receipts
would be healthier in the EU [1]. Although these pre-referendum statements did not affect its outcome,
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their impact on the whole post-referendum negotiation process, particularly in shaping the final
outcome of the UK and EU energy trade policy framework, should not be underestimated.
The immediate aftermath of the referendum results caused shock waves across different markets
of the EU member states. Moreover, the value of the pound sterling was significantly lowered against
all other major currencies in the financial maelstrom that followed the result [2–4]. The pound has
yet to fully recover from this slump [5]. The results also triggered a major realignment of economic
and political forces signaling unexpected international consequences [6]. The International Monetary
Fund predicted that Brexit would cause a reduction in the UK’s economic growth by 0.9% in 2017 and
a 0.1% reduction in global economic growth in both 2016 and 2017 [7]. As the dust settles following the
referendum and the triggering of Article 50 on 29 March 2017, there is still considerable uncertainty
about the future of Britain’s trade and industry.
These uncertainties are already hampering the growth and productivity of the UK’s economy.
In its November 2017 Inflation Report, the Bank of England (BOE) issued a warning about the
implication of Brexit. According to the BOE: “Uncertainties associated with Brexit are weighing on
domestic activity, which has slowed even as global growth has risen significantly. And Brexit-related
constraints on investment and labour supply appear to be reinforcing the marked slowdown that
has been increasingly evident in recent years in [relation to] the rate at which the economy can
grow without generating inflationary pressures” [8]. The UK government commissioned a study to
determine the predicted impact of Brexit on the UK’s industries. However, this report has remained
a secret, as it is believed that its release would undermine the ongoing negotiations between the UK
and the EU. However, from the outset, it is likely that there will be detrimental impacts on the UK’s
industries, and the energy sector in particular, which constitutes a significant part of its economic
activities, both with other EU member states and non-EU members. The UK’s notice of withdrawal
from the EU also included the intention to withdraw from the European Atomic Energy Community
(Euratom), a decision that some commentators argue poses a significant risk [9].
One of the immediate fallout of Brexit was the dramatic merger of the Department of Energy
and Climate Change (DECC) with the Department for Business, Innovation, and Skills to form a new
Department of Business, Energy, and Industrial Strategy (BEIS). BEIS, in keeping with the mandate of
the defunct DECC, will work under the National Energy Policy (NEP) to ensure that the UK has access
to secure, clean, and affordable energy supplies while meeting international standards on climate
change. It also has the responsibility of ensuring that the nation invests in clean energy and energy
efficiency projects that will drive down carbon emissions. The UK’s energy policy therefore aims
to ensure energy security regarding economic growth, the security of supply, and environmental
sustainability [10,11]. This is in line with the energy policy of the EU, which is based on three pillars:
competition, security of supply, and sustainability. The security of energy covers aspects such as
availability of supply, affordability, and sustainability, and is a major issue in the policy agenda of
every industrialised nation, including the UK [12].
The UK and the other EU-27 members have closely intertwined energy relations entrenched in the
Internal Energy Market (IEM). Their energy systems are operated in line with the principles and treaties
of international networks, including the International Energy Agency, the International Renewable
Energy Agency, the Energy Charter, the World Trade Organisation (WTO), and the recently articulated
European Energy Union. The resulting international agreements and directives are transposed into
domestic legislation with an overriding impact on the national policy frameworks. The energy and
climate change policies of both the UK and the EU have independently and collaboratively evolved
over the decades. Moreover, the influence of the UK as a strong advocate of market liberalisation
has also helped shape the direction of EU energy policies, to the extent that it must be considered
on both sides of the Brexit negotiation process. Table 1 below lists some of the relevant UK and EU
energy-related policies and regulations that are likely to be affected by Brexit. The UK’s energy is linked
to the EU through shared regulations, physical infrastructure (electricity and gas interconnectors),
trade relations, management, and a shared workforce [13]. Despite these existing connections with the
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EU, the UK energy policy has been described as being unfit for purpose, as it will fail to meet its key
goals [14]. Although the UK was formerly a front-runner in the liberalisation of the EU energy market,
it has arguably become a “prisoner of its ideological past” [14], bound between a liberated market
and central control. In recent years, there has been a paradigm shift towards intervention, but years
of inadequate planning have increased the UK’s vulnerability to future energy security crises [15,16].
Exiting the EU without access to the Energy Union could potentially make a bad situation worse.
Table 1. Related European Union (EU) and United Kingdom (UK) Energy Policies.
UK Regulations, Policies, and Obligations EU Regulations, Policies, and Obligations
Petroleum Act 1998 2020 Energy Strategy
Energy Act 2013 2020 Energy Strategy
Climate Change Act 2008 2050 Energy Strategy
Planning Act 2008 2030 Framework for Climate and Energy
Renewables Obligation Energy End-Use Efficiency and Energy Services
Carbon Emissions Reduction Target Renewable Energy Directives
Renewable Energy Directives Energy Performance Building Directive
Energy Efficiency Scheme Industrial Emission Directive
- EU Emission Trading Schemes
- Global Fuel Economy Initiative
The United Kingdom remains one of the largest contributors to the EU budget, with a gross
contribution of €14,870 million in 2011. Excluding intra-EU trading, the UK represents 19.4% of EU
exports [17]. This directly reflects on the UK’s significant contribution across the sectors. The UK
energy sector is significant to the overall economic growth of the nation, and is second only to the
contribution made by the financial sector. Moreover, the energy sector has several connections with
the EU through trading, directives, and energy unity. The eventual exit from the EU is likely to result
in the UK no longer being part of the EU Internal Energy Market (IEM), which ensures no restrictions
in relation to the flow of power and gas between the EU member states. This free flow is essential for
the UK to meet its energy demands [18]. At present, the UK would remain a member until at least
2019 and most probably longer, depending on the negotiations following the triggering of Article 50.
However, during the transition period, uncertainties will remain about the future of the UK’s energy
policy and its implications. While withdrawal from the EU is unlikely to change the UK’s energy policy
significantly due to the close alignment between their energy policies and frameworks [19], the key
issue will be the uncertainties generated by the exit negotiations. This is likely to affect short-term
investments, as investors will be hesitant due to the anticipated uncertainties in the negotiations.
A clear process with timings is essential for ensuring investors’ confidence [20]. As the negotiations for
the divorce begins, far-reaching implications are predicted for the economy and the energy industry.
The UK is a major European ally, and its departure is likely going to force major changes in the EU’s
energy and climate policies, with an overriding impact on many of the UK–EU energy regulations.
One of the key drivers of the referendum was the desire to control migration to the UK [21].
This will have further implications based on the experience of Switzerland, which was denied access
to the EU energy market due to the decision to impose restrictions on immigration in 2014, following
a referendum mandating the imposition of a quantitative limitation on migration. Depending on the
agreement reached during the negotiations, the UK is likely to be excluded from the single market
(including the IEM, unless this can be negotiated independently) on the grounds of the freedom of
movement of persons, which is one of the four fundamental principles determining inclusion into
the single market. The UK House of Lords EU Committee noted that the potential impact of Brexit
on energy would depend on whether the UK stays within the IEM. Therefore, exclusion from the EU
single market would have far-reaching implications for various areas of the UK energy market.
Currently, the lack of a clearly formulated plan has resulted in ongoing debates and uncertainties
about the manner of Brexit. The Prime Minister Theresa May had claimed that “Brexit means Brexit”,
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and that the UK would focus on a global Britain that trades freely with the rest of the world [22].
However, her insistence that “Brexit means Brexit” has been compromised by her failure to form
a majority government. According to Henokl [23], the hard-Brexit stand of the current government
is no longer set in stone following rising uncertainties regarding the timing and direction of the
exit negotiations. UK politicians have used various terms, including “hard, “soft” and “grey”
Brexit to describe the various options for a future relationship with the internal market. In the
Brexit White Paper, the UK stated that it “will be considering all future options for the UK’s future
relationship with the EU on energy, in particular to avoid disruption to the all-Ireland single electricity
market” [24,25]. However, the EU has criticised the ambiguity in the position papers produced by the
British government regarding the negotiation of the exit deal. The need for clarity in the UK’s position
is not only required for a successful Brexit, it is also essential for the direction of the markets and the
different industries connected to the energy sector.
The extent to which exiting the EU will impact on energy security and policies is very much open
to debate. Brexit is full of “unknowns”, and whilst its full effects on the UK’s economy remain a matter
of conjecture, it is not yet known what type of exit deal will be reached. In this paper, the potential
implications of Brexit and the triggering of Article 50 of the Lisbon Treaty on the future of UK energy
policy and security will be reviewed, in addition to examining options for exit negotiations in line with
some possible trading models and their potential consequences.
2. The IEM, Brexit Options, and Implications of Post-Brexit UK–EU Trade Models
The IEM was first introduced in 1988 in the “working document on Internal Energy” to help
remove any barriers to free trade and encourage the movement of energy within the EU [20].
These cross-border electricity and gas interconnections allow tariff-free energy trading across the
EU. The primary aim was to ensure energy security (supply, affordability, and sustainability),
as expressed in Article 194(1) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) [26,27].
The liberalisation of the gas and electricity markets in the 1990s led to the launch of EU Framework
Strategy for an Energy Union in 2015. This was primarily aimed at creating an effective cross-border
IEM addressing market access, interconnection, security of supply, regulation, and the cross-border
EU gas network. The IEM is also part of a broader community under the Energy Community Treaty,
which brings together the EU and other contracting states, including the Ukraine, Albania, and other
countries in southeast Europe and the Black Sea region. Under this arrangement, the EU and the
contracting states are able to trade energy across borders and co-develop infrastructures without legal
or trade barriers.
The UK has been a leading force in shaping EU market liberalisation policies over the years.
Their involvement in defining the internal energy market was broadly achieved through the following
three policy instruments [28]: first, the appropriation of existing competition laws to the energy sector;
second, the removal of barriers to competition and trade through specific energy directives; and third,
the articulation of internal market directives with extensive impacts on the energy sector, akin to the
directive on public procurement [29]. These policy initiatives have allowed for the harmonising of
tariff trading. Since the UK imports about 60% of its gas, the majority of which is from continental
Europe and Norway, access to the IEM is required to maintain its energy security.
The UK’s participation in the IEM post-Brexit will depend on the nature of the agreement reached
with the EU’s negotiators. One extreme post-Brexit option would involve quitting the EU without
a deal in place and no further preferential access to the IEM, or that no agreement is concluded within
the negotiation timeframe (hard Brexit). The other extreme would involve the UK continuing to have
a close relationship and ties with the EU and remain in the IEM with the adoption of the regulations
thereto, including some degree of free movement (soft Brexit). Between these two extreme options is a
grey Brexit, which would allow the UK to maintain some level of relationship with the EU in various
areas of trade, as governed by EU regulations. This would mean that the UK would have partial or
no access, save for a form of cooperation with the EU-27 [30]. In a soft Brexit scenario where the UK
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retains preferential access to the IEM, it is unlikely that Brexit would significantly impact UK energy
policies and security, as the current situation would continue. However, the UK would probably lose
the long-term leadership role that it had played in the liberalisation of the EU energy market, and may
also lose opportunities to lobby and influence the EU regulations with which it may have to comply.
The discourse of the possible implications of Brexit on the UK energy market will be crucially
underlined by the direction or model that the EU and the UK government adopts following the
negotiations. However, regardless of the model, seeking a free trade deal with the EU will ultimately
involve the UK accepting some form of legally binding obligations in exchange for access to the
single market [31]. This would be even more evident in any significant involvement in the IEM.
Various considered and plausible models that the UK and EU could adopt may include the World Trade
Organisation, the European Economic Area (EEA)/European Free Trade Association (EFTA)-Norway,
Switzerland, Turkey, the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA), and more recently,
the Association Agreement, which is premised on the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area and
includes trade agreements between the EU and Ukraine, Georgia, and Moldova.
With the WTO model involving a unilateral withdrawal (hard Brexit), the UK’s future
tariff schedule would need to be considered relative to the broader membership of the WTO.
However, it would be possible to retain the EU’s Most Favoured Nation (MFN) tariff schedule in situ,
or else consider those commodities and services that have better liberal rates in the tariffs between
individual EU and non-EU member states. Under the WTO regime, the UK will grant the same MFN
market access and charge similar tariffs to other WTO members. Also, the UK export to both the EU
and other WTO members would be subject to MFN tariffs, which would potentially raise the cost of
exporting to the EU. Also, under the terms of this regime, the free movement of labour between the
UK and the EU would cease, as would the right of access to EU service providers. The UK would
effectively return to its mid-Atlantic status.
The trade negotiations between the UK and the EU would be bilateral or intergovernmental.
It is possible that with Brexit, the UK could more quickly negotiate and reach agreements with different
countries under terms that would facilitate the national energy policy agenda. In further consideration
of the WTO model, Emerson [31] and Mustilli et al. [32] accentuated that the UK would restrict its
access to the single market if broader free trade deals were not negotiated and reached with the EU
outside the WTO framework, since individual EU member states would be obliged to adhere to the
terms of the EU’s agreements with the UK, restricting bilateral agreements between the UK and the
respective EU member states. This could be prolonged and time consuming. Moreover, the main
challenge to such a negotiation would be that the UK, despite its optimism, may be at the back of the
queue if the examples of other countries are worthy indications.
Alternatively, the UK could adopt the approach of a negotiated withdrawal by reaching a form
of agreement with the EU (soft or grey Brexit), as stipulated in Article 50(2) of the TEU. One such
trade agreement regime that the UK could consider is the EU–Swiss model. Under this model,
both contracting parties would have unrestricted access to trade and the movement of people.
Pursuant to Article 13 of the European Economic Community and the Swiss Confederation Free Trade
Agreement, a complete “prohibition on any quantitative measures” would inhibit trade, suggesting
that the issue of migration, which was a central issue in the referendum, remains integral to this model.
However, the safeguard clause under Article 28 articulates the following: “where one or more member
states of the community or Switzerland is in difficulties or is seriously threatened with difficulties as
regards its balance of payments, the contracting party concerned may take the necessary safeguard
measures. It shall inform the other contracting party forthwith. . . ” Such a clause enshrined in the
agreement could be used to mitigate these concerns. The major challenge this model would face in
relation to the UK–EU post-Brexit relationship is that it underscores the free movement of its citizens
as a prerequisite for any trade alliance. This conditionality makes this model very unlikely considering
the issues that triggered Brexit.
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The UK could also decide to join the European Economic Area (EEA) with Iceland, Liechtenstein,
and Norway. Under this arrangement, the UK would have access to the single market, but not to
agriculture or fisheries. However, some contribution would have to be made to the EU in addition to
complying with most environmental regulations, with no voting rights or ability to influence them.
Moreover, the EEA arrangement does not provide access to EU trade deals with non-member states.
The UK could also consider the EU–Turkey model (Customs Union), which allows the UK to retain
the EU’s common external tariff. Under this model, the UK exports to the EU would not be subject to
customs control, but there would be restricted access to people and services.
Another option is the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) model akin to the
EU–Korea agreement, which offers a possible comprehensive approach to implementing post-Brexit
relations between the EU and the UK. Although CETA has not been fully ratified by both contracting
parties, it has a detailed framework that considers the major trade aspects of two advanced economies
with comparable strong regulatory standards. However, the downside of implementing this framework
within the EU–UK context is that CETA does not incorporate the market regulations that a country
such as the UK would require to access the IEM.
A more realistic model adaptable to preserving UK interests and meeting her concerns would be
the three-freedom model (free movement of goods, services, and capital, but not people). This model
is similar to the Association Agreement model that the EU currently holds with Moldova, Ukraine,
and Georgia, which allows the extensive inclusion of these associate states in the single market, with the
exception of the free movement of people. As an integration-orientated agreement, it includes concepts,
principles, and provisions of EU laws that are to be interpreted and applied with the fundamental
assumption that the third state is part of the EU [33]. Table 2 summarises the various options and
implications for access to the single market.
Table 2. Possible Options for the UK–EU Relationship Post-Brexit. FTA: Free Trade Agreement,
EEA: European Economic Area; CETA: Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement; WTO: World
Trade Organisation.
Possible Exit Model Financial Contributionto the EU
Compliance with the
EU Legal System
Influence over
EU Rules
Access to Single Market
Goods Services People Capital
EU Membership Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
EU–SWISS FTA Model Yes Yes No Yes(partial)
Yes
(partial) Yes yes
EEA yes yes No Yes(partial) yes yes yes
CETA No No No Yes(partial)
Yes
(partial)
Yes
(partial)
Yes
(partial)
Custom Union No No No Yes(partial) No No
Yes
(partial)
Association Agreement No Yes partial No Yes(partial) Yes No Yes
WTO No No No No No No No
However, the impact on every sector of the UK and EU economies is undefined. The agreed
regime would certainly have far-reaching impacts on the different sectors, not least the petroleum
industry, the electricity market, the renewable technology sector, not to mention the impact on the
future direction of environmental policies. The EU and UK are very much aware that undermining
each other in the negotiation process will consequently undermine the collective good, and to this
end, the importance of negotiating a regime that is beneficial to the general interest requires the
fostering of a conducive model that will benefit both parties. This will require compromise from both
sides. Taking hard lines could potentially escalate the uncertainties and worsen the current precarious
situation for all concerned.
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3. Potential Impacts of Brexit on the UK’s Energy Sectors
As discussed in the preceding sections, the overall impact of Brexit on the UK’s energy policy and
security will be dependent on the nature of the agreement reached with the EU. In the following section,
the potential implications of Brexit on different sections of the UK energy industry will be articulated.
3.1. Impacts of Brexit on the UK Oil and Gas Industry
With the triggering of Article 50, and as the UK begins to negotiate its exit deal with the
EU, there are likely to be high degrees of political, economic, commercial, and legal uncertainties.
However, no immediate change to the legal and regulatory regime governing the petroleum industry
is expected in the short to medium term [34]. The major regulatory frameworks that govern the UK
petroleum industry are derived from domestic policies such as the Petroleum Act of 1998, with the
EU having no significant effect on upstream petroleum activities. Hence, the UK’s upstream oil and
gas policy is unlikely to change radically as a result of Brexit [18]. The oil and gas sector is majorly
cyclical in nature, with its varying degrees of uncertainty usually controlled and influenced by the
international market. Since the EU has a limited influence on the petroleum market, the UK is likely to
have total control over its oil and gas sector [34]. However, this state of affairs is likely to hold only
in the short to medium term, as future barriers may arise as a divorce deal is agreed between the UK
and the EU.
The uncertainties already created by Brexit are likely to significantly impact the levels of
investment in the UK continental shelf (UKCS), as investments may be delayed until some of the
uncertainties are resolved during the two or more years of negotiations. Planned projects are also likely
to be delayed as a result, with a faster decline of investment in the continental shelf. This may result in
a decline in adequate common use infrastructures, resulting in exploration becoming uneconomic and
the “UKCS entering a self-perpetuating cycle of decline”, according to LaMaster and Hammerson [34].
Additionally, the effect of Brexit on the devaluing of the pound against major currencies makes
investment in the UKCS less attractive, as most fields are marginal. The European Investment Bank
(EIB) is a major investor in the UK energy sector. Any exit term that excludes the UK from the single
market is likely to have a negative impact on the willingness of the EIB to continue to invest in the UK
at the same rate as when it remained part of the EU.
Another major uncertainty would be the UK’s future access to the EU Internal Energy Market
(IEM). The UK exports its oil products to the EU while remaining a net importer of refined oil and gas,
with a significant amount coming from the EU. With the UK currently being part of the IEM, there are
no restrictions in relation to the flow of power and gas between the EU member states; hence, the UK
still enjoys zero import and export tariffs. It also opens new markets for consumers at a reduced cost,
as wholesale energy prices are lower on the continent. This is quite beneficial to the UK’s energy
security and sustainability. If the final deal excludes the UK from the IEM, and results in the UK
entering into World Trade Organisation (WTO)-governed deals, this will have significant far-reaching
implications for the country’s energy security and sustainability. Brexit could lead to households
paying more for each unit of energy they consume, at least in the short term, due to costlier taxes
and tariffs on energy imports. Moreover, this could be exacerbated due to starved investments in
exploration and development projects in the UKCS. If the UK is excluded from the IEM, there will
probably be an urgent need for policy change in the sector. Also, the drop in the value of the sterling
against the US dollar and the Euro following the Brexit vote will stimulate gas exports through the
interconnectors if the sterling resets at a lower level against other major currencies. This will translate to
a higher cost of importation of liquefied natural gas (LNG) from the Middle East. Further implications
could be that the British public would bear the brunt of higher wholesale energy prices and increased
government taxes.
Another key area where Brexit could impact the petroleum industry is the availability of skilled
personnel [35]. The UK North Sea operation and emerging shale gas business relies heavily on a skilled
labour force from the EU and beyond. According to Virley [10], it is crucial that skilled workers from
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the continent can contribute to the progress of the oil and gas sector in the UK without any border
restrictions. As the British government negotiates an exit deal, the petroleum industry would request
the guaranteed free movement of labour to ensure their ability to meet the challenges associated with
a specialist skilled workforce. New restrictions on EU staff or UK staff working in Europe would be
damaging to the industry.
Furthermore, another possible consequence of the Brexit vote could be the second call for a
referendum by the Scottish National Party (SNP). If Scotland becomes an independent nation, most of
the oil and gas fields in the UKCS would come under an exclusive Scottish economic zone. As this
possibility builds momentum, uncertainties are likely to be created for investors, resulting in a decline
in investment over the next two years as London and Brussels negotiate a deal. If a second Scottish
referendum is triggered and the UK splits into independent countries, there will be questions as to
whether London or Edinburgh would be laying claim to North Sea oil. Further uncertainties will
probably ensue that will have far-reaching and potentially damaging effects on the struggling North
Sea petroleum industry, especially at a time when the industry is going through periods of painful
restructuring as a result of the crash in oil prices. Although the call for independence has had a setback
with the recent election resulting in the Scottish National Party losing significant seats, the outcome of
the Brexit negotiations could nevertheless trigger another wave of agitation to leave the UK.
3.2. Impacts of Brexit on the UK Electricity Market
Most of the UK’s electricity regulations either implement EU directives or are directly imposed
by them, including the Electricity Directive, the Electricity Regulation, the Regulation on Energy
Market Integrity and Transparency (REMIT), the Renewables Directive, and the regulation creating the
Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators (ACER). In November 2016, the EU proposed major
modifications with new regulations in the “winter package” aimed at fostering greater cooperation
between regulators and transmission system operators at both regional and continental levels.
While most of these regulations are closely enmeshed in the UK’s electricity framework, post-Brexit,
the UK will still require a re-assessment of the framework for energy regulation, and may still require
some form of agreement with the EU in order to function effectively.
The UK electricity system is one of the oldest in the world, and its infrastructure is aging fast,
with over a dozen power plants due to be decommissioned in the next decade. Over 100 billion pounds
of investment is therefore required over the next few years to replace its ageing electricity generation
and transmission infrastructure. The UK government puts the value at £140 bn of investment needed
by 2030 [36], while some observers put the figure even higher. With the current economic climate and
post-Brexit uncertainties, attracting such a huge investment will be more difficult considering that four
of the top six energy suppliers in the UK are in the hands of EU owners [37]. Already, some of the
investors behind the currently planned power generation projects are reconsidering their decisions.
Wholesale electricity prices are lower in continental Europe compared to the UK. This is mainly
because electricity is more expensive to generate in the UK than in most EU states. Currently, the UK
electricity market is connected to the Republic of Ireland, France, the Netherlands, and continental
Europe [38]. The gas and electricity networks are linked through interconnectors that allow them to
flow through the transmission systems of the UK and other EU countries. The interconnectors facilitate
both the integration and trading of energy within the Union. There are four currently operational
interconnectors: IFA1 in France; Moyle and EWIC, which are both in Ireland; and BritNed in the
Netherlands, which provide the UK with an additional 4000 MW of electricity capacity. A further
14,000 MW capacity is planned [39]. According to McHarg [19], access to these cross-border flows
of gas and electricity is required to ensure the continued security of supply in the UK, considering
that the country is a net importer of electricity with increasingly tighter supply margins and a rapidly
ageing electricity production infrastructure. It has been estimated that the economic cost of reversing
the decades of energy market integration with the EU could be up to £1 bn a year [40]. Moreover,
Ireland is connected to the IEM through the UK. Should the UK exit the Energy Union, this would
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cause acute consequences for Ireland, resulting in both economic losses and political instability [39,41].
The Single Electricity Market (SEM) that is currently regulated by the Irish Commission for Energy
Regulation was established in 2007, and operates between the Republic of Ireland and Northern
Ireland. The SEM is subject to the EU’s energy regime, and if this remains the case post-Brexit, a part of
the UK (Northern Ireland) would continue to be subject to EU laws. If the SEM is revoked as a result
of Brexit, this would cause significant political tension between the Republic of Ireland and Northern
Ireland, and potentially reverse over a decade of energy integration [42]. Froggart et al. [43] described
this scenario as one of the sharp dilemmas of Brexit.
Furthermore, a hard Brexit that would require the UK to exit from the IEM will probably have
a significant impact on UK energy security. In the medium to long term, there will be concerns
with interconnection, and hence energy security [44]. Interconnectors link substantial amounts
of energy to the UK through countries such as France and the Netherlands, and are sometimes
more reliable than local UK generation [20]. Moreover, the electricity interconnection is attractive
to investors in the electricity sector as a result of Carbon Price Support (CPS), which is a significant
determinant of wholesale electricity prices. It accounts for nearly 15% of the current market wholesale
prices [45]. ‘Brexiting’ the Energy Union without a similar support mechanism would also make
investments in electricity interconnection less attractive. The UK would then have to resort to local
energy production, mainly from coal, which is currently a costlier alternative to importing from
the EU. Although the National Grid has assured UK customers that Brexit will not have any direct
impact on the national electricity security supply, according to Villanacci [46], it will be difficult for
the UK government to maintain generation margins. With a potential hard Brexit, the UK would
also lose access to cross-border energy balancing and capacity market integration [39]. The House of
Commons’ Energy and Climate Change Committee posited in a report that the UK was “heavily reliant
on Europe” for imports of gas and electricity, and a hard Brexit deal could leave the UK vulnerable to
an energy crisis [47].
The UK Energy Act of 2013 put in place the Electricity Market Reform (EMR) to encourage
investment in low-carbon electricity generation [48]. The ultimate aim of the EMR is based on the
energy trilemma: the security of supply, sustainability, and competition to ensure the reduced cost
of electricity to the consumer. This was also meant to create a stable, long-term electricity market
that would stimulate investors’ confidence and improve the attractiveness of the UK energy sector.
The purpose of the EMR would come under threat if the UK exits the single market, as this would
potentially affect the availability of EU funding for planned UK infrastructural investments.
Summarily, in the short term, the currency fluctuations post-Brexit will probably result in an
increase in wholesale energy and consumer prices [49]. According to the Energy Institute [50],
electricity prices are forecast to rise, despite anticipated lower costs for natural gas. This predicted rise
was attributed to the cost of new innovation and the limits of the existing generation, which indicates
concerns for the security of supply in the UK. The uncertainties of Brexit and the potential exit from
the single market may cause further increases. In a hard Brexit scenario where the UK leaves the
EU internal market, it will no longer benefit from tariff-free access to EU markets. This implies that
the EU common customs tariff (MFN tariff) would apply to UK imports and exports. Post-Brexit,
the EU would probably apply fees and taxes to electricity or gas piped into the UK, with little room for
manoeuvre, as the UK is currently a net importer of energy. Any electricity trade between the UK and
the EU involving any form of tariff would lead to increased costs that would translate to higher energy
bills for consumers [39]. However, amidst the potential negative impacts of Brexit on the supply of
electricity to UK customers, ‘brexiting’ the EU could be an opportunity for major domestic electricity
market reforms that will not be constrained by any EU laws and regulations.
3.3. Impacts of Brexit on UK Renewable Energy and Climate Change Policies
Over the years, the UK has developed exemplary renewable energy schemes, mainly supported
by the government. Some of these have inspired technological growth and development and the
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increased acceptance and use of renewable energy in the UK. The Renewable Obligation encouraged
suppliers to source an ever-increasing amount of their electricity from renewable sources, providing
some incentive to them in the form of financial rewards for the life of the assets. A similar programme
was also developed to encourage small producers under the feed-in tariff (FiT), which is designed to
support small-scale renewable installations up to 5 MW. Generators are then paid a tariff for every
unit of electricity they produce, with any excess being sold to the National Grid for further financial
reward [51]. As part of the electricity market reforms, a new scheme named the feed-in-tariff with
a Contract for Difference (CfD) is being developed to support renewables and low-carbon technologies.
Currently, renewable energy accounts for more than 21% of all of the electricity capacity produced
internally. This is projected to rise to about 30% by the year 2020, playing a significant role in electricity
generation in the UK [52]. Also, the UK is a global leader in offshore wind energy developments,
with approximately 5/12 of global offshore wind capacity as of 2015. It has been projected that the UK
will deliver up to 50 GW of offshore wind energy by 2035 [53].
However, the general appeal for investment in renewable energy in the UK has diminished to an
all-time low in recent years. This has been attributed to the future uncertainties of supplies and market
prices. Also, the premature cessation of the renewables obligation, the present government’s choice
of nuclear and gas over renewable energy, and now Brexit, are the major contributory factors to the
decline [37,54]. Consequently, it will become increasingly difficult to find adequate investors to finance
renewable energy projects in the UK post-Brexit [55]. In addition, Brexit is estimated to raise trade
costs [40], and trade costs are necessary for the home market effect. According to Ottaviano et al. [56],
a rise in trade cost is likely to cause a 3.1% drop in the GDP of the UK in the long term.
The UK economy relies significantly on the EU for trade, both within the Union and globally. It also
receives significant funding for renewable energy from the European Research Council. Since 2007,
the EIB has invested more than £7 billion in UK renewable energy projects, making it the largest
recipient of EIB funding [57]. Post-Brexit, it is unclear as to what kind of relations will exist between
the UK and the EIB. Non-EU countries have received only about 12% of funding from the EIB [56];
hence, this suggests that there may be a significant reduction in the funding available to the UK should
they exit the single market. However, the UK is a major shareholder in the EIB, with nearly 17%.
It is therefore difficult to speculate on the medium to long-term impact of Brexit on EIB investments in
the UK. The possibility of withdrawal to support renewable projects that have already been earmarked
for funding is unlikely, as Brexit negotiations may last beyond the planned two-year period due to
the complexities that will be involved. It can therefore be argued that the impact of the UK exiting
the EU on the renewable energy sector will be more related to the potential lack of investment due
to the uncertainties of Brexit, and the lack of preferential access to the IEM in a hard Brexit scenario.
Hence, Jensen and Snaith [58] have posited that there are greater advantages for the UK to remain in
the single market.
There may be far-reaching implications for the renewable energy sector should the UK exit
the single market. Various EU initiatives in energy infrastructure investments, combined electricity
trading, and price harmonisation are likely to be jeopardised. Also, the UK will lose out on research
and innovation funding for energy from the Eight Framework programme and the European Research
Council, with a budget of £75 billion and a projection to run until 2020. While investment would
continue to diminish from the EU with an exit from the single market, conversely, this could afford the
UK government more flexibility in funding its renewable energy projects and obligations.
Furthermore, the EU Renewable Energy Directive (RED) sets targets for every member state as to
what percentage of energy consumed should be sourced from renewables by the year 2020. The UK
was not in favour of the ambitious target set by the EU, and hence argued that market forces should
instead promote renewable energy. According to the National Grid, the UK is likely to miss its 2009
agreed EU RED target of 15% [59,60]. Therefore, an exit from EU would allow the UK to miss its 15%
target without facing any sanctions.
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Climate change was not cited as a reason for the UK population voting to leave the EU.
However, Brexit may have potential implications for the UK’s climate change policies, as they
were developed in line with the EU’s climate policy as part of the United Nations Convention on
Climate Change (UNFCCC). The EU climate change regulations are centered on three key frameworks:
the Emission Trading Scheme (EU ETS); emissions not covered by the ETS; and frameworks promoting
energy efficiency, renewable energy, and carbon capture and storage. The UK has been playing
a leading role in the commitment to cut greenhouse gas emissions, with an 80% reduction commitment
by 2050, as enshrined in the UK Climate Change Act, 2008 (CCA). However, the Climate Change Act is
national legislation, and will not be directly affected by Brexit. Therefore, the UK is unlikely going to
change direction in this regard during the exit negotiations or after leaving the EU. In fact, after the
Brexit vote, the UK government recently approved the recommended fifth carbon budget, covering
the periods 2028–2032. Post-Brexit, the UK would probably not be obliged to comply with European
energy and climate directives. However, the commitments are unlikely to change. Also, with the US
exiting the Paris Accord, the UK has a major role to play in championing emissions reduction on the
global stage. It is currently unclear as to whether the UK will remain with the EU ETS or implement
its own national trading schemes and carbon taxes post-Brexit. The Energy and Climate Change
Committee has warned that another alternative measure to the EU ETS could be costly, complicated,
or politically difficult to implement [19,61].
If the UK decides to back out of its current climate and renewables commitments, it may have
a greater negative impact on the EU than the UK, as the remaining EU-27 members will find it more
challenging to deliver their commitments under the Paris Agreement. With the UK (a strong advocate
for emissions regulations) exiting the EU, the balance of power within the EU-27 would shift towards
the climate change sceptic member states, particularly with the increasing significance of Poland.
According to Niblock [62], the UK’s absence in the EU “will echo through global climate discussions
in ways that may complicate or even drag down progress” in the fight against climate change on the
global stage.
3.4. Impact on Shale Gas Development (SGD)
Shale gas development (SGD) in the EU has been hampered by several factors, including
environmental concerns and the call for regulatory reforms within the EU [63]. The member states
of the EU are consequently looking at SGD in a different light. While some member states, such as
France, have called for a total ban, others such as Poland and the UK are early adopters, with the
remainder states are in the group of “contemplators” [64]. Issues related to SGD have been debated
in the EU parliament, and there remains a divide between supporters and opponents of SGD.
However, a resolution by the EU Parliamentary Committee on Environment, Public Health and
Food Safety (ENVI) showed optimism for the potential of SGD to improve energy security among
member states of the EU, but requested a review of existing EU regulations to cover its potential
environmental consequences. Some members of the European Parliament (MEPs) who were not
convinced by the resolution offered an amendment to place a moratorium on any new fracking
operations in the EU [64]. Other committees have also debated the issues, with a similar divide evident
among MEPs.
With the potential of technically recoverable shale gas reserves of 150 to 1130 billion cubic
meters [65,66], and the decline of the previously vast North Sea gas field, SGD could play
a significant role in reducing the UK’s dependence on gas imports from the EU and the rest of
the world. Consequently, the UK government has given the go ahead for SGD, despite opposition
from local authorities and environmental pressure groups. With the EU’s plan to regulate SGD,
some commentators are of the opinion that Brexit could help the growth of the shale gas industry,
because of the drive for energy security and the potential higher cost of energy in a hard Brexit
scenario. Also, the nascent industry could be aided by the falling pound. In a soft Brexit scenario,
where for example the UK joins Iceland, Liechtenstein, and Norway to become part of the EEA, the UK
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would have to comply with most of the EU environmental regulations, and may be restrained in the
development of its shale gas resources, while being unable to influence their shaping.
3.5. Impacts on EU Energy Project Funding
In a hard Brexit scenario where the UK exits the IEM, UK interconnectors may lose their
designation as interconnectors, and hence their status as Projects of Common Interest (PCIS) [39].
PCIS benefit from EU funding, as they are considered vital in the achievement of the Energy Union’s
objectives. Several UK projects have obtained PCI status, and many more have made applications.
It remains uncertain whether they would be considered as PCI post-Brexit, particularly if the UK
exits the IEM. A hard Brexit would result in the UK losing access to the Connecting Europe Facility
(CEF), with an estimated investment fund of 5.35 billion Euros in connectivity projects covering the
IEM by 2020.
Furthermore, as previously alluded, the UK would lose access to the EU clean energy innovation
fund if it exits the Energy Union. The UK currently receives a large chunk of EU energy-related
funding through the Financial Instrument for the Environment (LIFE+) and Horizon 2020 research
funds. There would also be no access to the EU’s €1.6 billion funds for low-carbon projects (2004–2020).
Over the last 16 years, Britain has benefitted in more than £37 billion of funding from the EIB for
low-carbon innovation projects. However, the uncertainties created by Brexit have lowered the
confidence of low-carbon investors [61,67]. Therefore, researchers in the UK remain uncertain about
the future of funding for energy research. Although the Prime Minister has made assurances of filling
any gaps in EU funding generated as a result of Brexit, it is apparent that the UK would be better off
remaining in the IEM, as negotiations begin on a settlement deal with the EU.
3.6. Implications for the Nord Stream II Pipeline Projects
The Nord Stream II (NS2) pipeline is proposed to transport gas from Russia through the
Baltic Sea to Germany. The project is one of the most contentious and debated energy projects
in Europe. Despite enthusiasm in Berlin, several of the Baltic States and Poland are against the
proposed development, as they argue that it will increase Russia’s dominance in gas supply to the EU,
which is against the EU’s goal of diversifying energy supplies and reducing the dependence on gas
from Russia. Currently, the EU is proposing to legislate all of the pipelines that bring gas to the Union.
This is to ensure that all of the pipelines importing gas meet the principles of non-discriminatory tariffs,
transparent reporting, and ownership unbundling. One of the implications of Brexit to the EU’s Energy
Union is for the solidarity principle. With fierce contentions between EU member states regarding the
NS2 pipeline project, the absence of the UK as a tempering member of the Union would be felt as the
proposal is debated. The UK has been a major voice against the NS2 project, and departing the EU will
weaken the resistance that Berlin would encounter in Brussels as they push for the actualisation of
the project. The other potential implication of the NS2 project is likely to be related to structure and
pricing [68]. The NS2 project will impact the north–south gas competitiveness within the EU, ensuring
that the interconnectors to the northwestern market are liquid. However, it could undermine the
gas diversification efforts in southeastern Europe. Furthermore, with continuing disagreements and
fierce oppositions to the NS2 project by Poland and the Baltic States, and the possibility that the UK
post-Brexit could be free from all EU regulations such as the EU’s Third Energy Package, the diversion
of the NS2 pipeline project from Germany to the UK remains a possibility.
4. Conclusions
It began as a dream for some, but now as a reality, Brexit is here to stay. Its short, medium and
long-term implications for the UK economy are now immanent, and the full implications and options
for energy security must be understood. The uncertainties that have ensued following the Brexit
referendum and the triggering of Article 50 of the TEU have already caused a drop in the growth
and productivity of the UK economy. At present, the UK’s energy policy and security are closely
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intertwined and entrenched in the IEM. While the energy policies and climate change commitments
under the Paris Agreement are unlikely to change significantly, as the UK has been a major advocate
of emission reduction on the global stage, an exit from the EU with no preferential access to the IEM
would increase the vulnerability of the UK to an energy security crisis, making an already bad situation
worse. The post-Brexit uncertainties that could spur the reduction of investment flows into the UK
energy sector, including renewable energy, could in turn stimulate an increased dependency on foreign
gas and electricity imports, and as a consequence see UK consumers pay more per unit of energy.
Post-Brexit the UK would also lose access to significant funding for energy infrastructure from the EU.
Appropriating the right measures, including the correct policy initiatives, and ensuring that the UK
maintains some form of preferential access to the IEM would go a long way to mitigate the potentially
negative effects of Brexit on the energy sector.
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